Going for It on Fourth and Long: Gambling Public Funds on a New Vikings Stadium by Patton, Theodore J.
University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 7
Issue 2 Spring 2013 Article 5
Going for It on Fourth and Long: Gambling Public
Funds on a New Vikings Stadium
Theodore J. Patton
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.stthomas.edu/ustjlpp
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy. For
more information, please contact Editor-in-Chief Patrick O'Neill.
Bluebook Citation
Theodore J. Patton, Going for It on Fourth and Long: Gambling Public Funds on a New Vikings Stadium, 7 U. St. Thomas J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
240 (2013).
GOING FOR IT ON FOURTH AND LONG:
GAMBLING PUBLIC FUNDS ON A NEW
VIKINGS STADIUM
THEODORE J PATTON*O±
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 240
II. BACKGROUND ............................................ 241
A. The Rise of the Publicly Funded Sports Cathedral................... 241
B. A BrieffHistory ofMinnesota's Sports Facilities ..... ..... 242
C. Minnesota's Response to Sports-Franchise Roulette................ 243
III. THE NEW VIKINGS STADIUM ............................. 245
IV. ANALYSIS .................................... ..... 248
A. Recent History: Defining the Problem ........... ...... 248
B. Looking to the Future: Determining the Options ..... ..... 250
V. RECOMMENDATION ............................. ..... 252
A. Cementing the Relationship Between the Vikings and Minnesota
................................. .... 252
B. League Rules and Antitrust Argument ................. 253
C. Utilizing a Rival's Model in Minnesota ......... ........ 255
VI. CONCLUSION...................................... 256
INTRODUCTION
We are bearing witness to the second largest fleecing of public funds in
a generation: sports stadiums.' As Ken Belson poignantly wrote, stadiums
* J.D., University of Iowa, 2010; M.S., University of Iowa, 2009; B.A., University of Vermont,
2005.
O The author is a private attorney in Minneapolis and the views expressed herein do not represent
those of his clients, colleagues, or firm.
± This article would not have been possible without the support of my wife, Elizabeth; the comments
of my friend, Joshua Strom; and the encouragement and professionalism of The University of St.
Thomas Journal ofLaw and Public Policy.
1. Undoubtedly, this generation's largest fleecing was the Troubled Asset Relief Program
coupled with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. See Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified as amended in
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built with public funds are "the gift[s] that keep on taking."2 Nationwide,
sports franchises are extracting taxpayer funding for the construction of state-
of-the-art stadiums filled with luxurious amenities and gourmet food.3
Owners have proven very effective at coercing state and local officials to
provide them with new stadiums by threatening to move their franchises to
other cities.' Owners promise that new stadiums will spur economic growth
by providing jobs, an influx of capital, and quality of life benefits.' After all,
professional leagues constitute a monopoly with far fewer teams than the
number of cities that desire them. Publicly financed sports stadiums,
however, are "a public investment in real capital. As such, the rules for
sensible public investment apply to stadium finance as much as they apply to
public provision of highways, schools, and airports."' Namely, do the
owners' promises of economic development provide a worthwhile return on
government subsidies and what, if any, are the alternatives?' This article will
examine those questions in the context of the new Minnesota Vikings
("Vikings") stadium.
BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of the Publicly Funded Sports Cathedral
Since the American Civil War, sports have played an increasingly
prominent role in American public life. Some scholars have even argued that
sports represent a "civil religion" in American culture. Frank Ferreri, a
theology professor at the University of South Florida, wrote that sports, "as
an American cultural institution, serve as a meaning-giving agency that can
shape individual and community identities, offer a systematic method for
interpreting morality, and provide an avenue through which to experience
sacredness."' Similar to the identification of European cities by their awe-
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 19
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C.).
2. Ken Belson, As Stadiums Vanish, Their Debt Lives On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/sports/08stadium.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
3. Pat Garofalo & Travis Waldron, If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky
Economics ofSports Stadiums, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 7, 2012, www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/
260900/.
4. Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, The Stadium Gambit and Local Economic
Development, 23 ECON. DEV. POL'Y 15, 16 (2000).
5. Christopher Diedrich, Homefield Economics: The Public Financing ofStadiums, 4 POL'Y
MATTERS J. 22, 22 (2007).
6. Coates & Humphreys, supra note 4, at 17.
7. ROBERT A. BAADE, THE HEARTLAND INST., NO. 62 STADIUMS, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS,
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSING THE REALITY 1 (1994).
8. Frank Ferreri, Sports and the American Sacred: What are the Limits of Civil Religion?
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inspiring cathedrals from the Middle Ages, the modem sports stadium has
supplanted the ancient cathedral "as the most visible and recognizable
structure in many communities."' Until the 1960s, however, professional
sports stadiums were quite spartan in design and largely funded by the private
sector." In fact, only five of the major league sports facilities built prior to
World War II were paid for in whole or in part by public funds." At the time,
public works were defined as "bridges, roads, sewers and so on: basic
infrastructure that was used by all and was unlikely to be built by the private
sector." 2 As professional sports pursued expansion, cities began providing
franchises with "sweetheart deals"-often centered around state-of-the-art
facilities-to lure them from other places in what is becoming sports-
franchise roulette." By 2012, 125 of the 140 teams in the five largest
professional leagues were playing in stadiums "constructed or significantly
refurbished since 1990."4 Construction costs of the 125 stadiums totaled
more than $30 billion with a majority of the cost being borne by the public."
B. A BriefHistory ofMinnesota's Sports Facilities
As a result of interest from other cities, Minnesota has been on the
defensive in an attempt to maintain its status as "one of only six metropolitan
areas with franchises in all four pro[fessional] sports leagues." 6 Up until the
early 1990s, however, it seemed highly improbable that any of Minnesota's
teams would be lured to another city because the state had, what were
considered to be at the time, state-of-the-art sports facilities." For example,
the Metrodome-constructed to serve as home to the Minnesota Vikings and
Minnesota Twins-was opened in 1982.18 The Metrodome cost $55 million
to construct and was largely publicly funded through an increase in hotel,
food, and alcohol taxes.'9 The Target Center-home to the Minnesota
Graduate School Theses and Dissertations, 25 (2004), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article= 2031 &context-etd.
9. ROBERT C. TRUMPBOUR, THE NEW CATHEDRALS: POLITICS AND MEDIA IN THE HISTORY
OF STADIUM CONSTRUCTION 2 (2006).
10. Belson, supra note 2.
11. Adam M. Zaretsky, Should Cities Pay for Sports Facilities?, THE REGIONAL ECONOMIST,
Apr. 2001, at 6.
12. Belson, supra note 2.
13. Id.
14. Robert A. Baade & Victor A. Matheson, Financing Professional Sports Facilities 3 (Coll.
of the Holy Cross, Dep't of Econ. Faculty Research Series, Working Paper No. 11-02, 2011).
15. Id.
16. NEIL DEMAUSE & JOANNA CAGAN, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT STADIUM
SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT 166 (Univ. ofNeb. Press rev. and expanded
ed. 2008).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Timberwolves-opened in 1990.20 The stadium was constructed for a total
cost of $104 million. 2' The owners of the Timberwolves paid $81 million and
the remainder was publicly funded.22 The North Stars-Minnesota's National
Hockey League ("NHL") team-played at the Metropolitan Sports Center
(the "Met Center").23 While older than the Metrodome and the Target Center,
the Met Center was revered in Minnesota.24 The 16,000 person arena sold out
even for state high school hockey tournaments.25 Minnesota's dedication to
the Met Center reflected Minnesota's passion for hockey; in Minnesota,
hockey is a way of life. Reality set in when the North Stars unexpectedly left
town. The team's relocation to Dallas was announced on March 10, 1993.26
The team's owner, Norm Green, considered relocating to the Target Center,
but ultimately chose Dallas as it provided "a better economic situation." 27
C. Minnesota's Response to Sports-Franchise Roulette
Following the relocation of the North Stars to Dallas, there was an
undercurrent of panic regarding Minnesota's remaining professional sports
teams. The tension was palpable and resulted in a public spending binge. The
state could have reportedly kept the North Stars for $17 million in facility
upgrades.28 Instead, public outrage over the loss of the North Stars resulted
in taxpayers spending more than $130 million for an expansion franchise-
the Minnesota Wild-six years later.29 In order to house the Wild, the
Minnesota Legislature approved a $65 million loan to the City of St. Paul,
and the City of St. Paul issued an additional $72.7 million in bonds.30 Fifteen
years after St. Paul broke ground on the Wild's arena (the Xcel Energy
Center), the state forgave most of the remaining $32.7 million loan balance
owed by the City of St. Paul." Unfortunately for Minnesota taxpayers, the
North Star's departure was only the beginning.32 Construction of the Wild's
20. Id.
21. DEMAUSE & CAGAN, supra note 16, at 166.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See JAY WEINER, STADIUM GAMES: FIFTY YEARS OF BIG LEAGUE GREED AND BUSH
LEAGUE BOONDOGGLES 158 (Univ. of Minn. Press 2000) (calling the Met Center a "hallowed
temple for many Minnesota puckheads").
25. Leigh Montville, Spleen for Green: Norm Green is Reviled in Minnesota for his Decision
to Move the North Stars South, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 19, 1993, at 36, 37.
26. Id. at 36.
27. Id.
28. Diedrich, supra note 5, at 25.
29. Kevin Duchschere, St. Paul Wins Forgiveness ofXcel Arena Loan, STAR TRIBUNE, May
22, 2013, at B2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. DEMAUSE & CAGAN, supra note 16, at 166 (indicating that the Metrodome and Target
Center did rely on some public funding, but the difference is scale).
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arena-at great public expense-opened Pandora's Box and set a precedent
for the owners of Minnesota's other professional sports franchises.
After the Timberwolves failed to convince the North Stars to relocate to
the Target Center, the Timberwolves' ownership announced that they were
moving the franchise to New Orleans in 1994, unless the City of Minneapolis
agreed to purchase the arena.33 The City of Minneapolis balked and funded a
$74 million purchase of the stadium with a combination of sales and property
tax increases.34 Once the city's purchase of the Target Center was complete,
the Timberwolves' ownership sold the team for $88.5 million, "turning a 172
percent five-year profit on their original $32.5 million investment."" The
"Target Center bailout" did not resonate well with Minneapolis residents, and
approximately $55 million remains outstanding.36
In 1996, Minnesota Twins owner Carl Pohlad, who witnessed the
corporate welfare provided to the Minnesota Wild and Minnesota
Timberwolves, unsurprisingly announced that his team needed a new
stadium." Pohlad argued that the Twins were "second-class citizens" in the
Metrodome, because the Vikings controlled the Metrodome's luxury-suite
revenue and the multipurpose stadium was configured "more for football than
for baseball."38 Pohlad threatened to opt out of the Twins' lease in the
Metrodome "if a new stadium [was] not in the works by 1998."39 While the
Twins demands for a new stadium went unanswered for nearly a decade,
Hennepin County succumbed in 2006 and issued sales tax revenue bonds in
the amount of $350 million-two-thirds of the new stadium's total cost of
$545 million. 40 Hennepin County, with state approval, levied a sales tax of
0.15 percent in order to cover the cost of the bonds.4 1 According to Forbes,
Target Field increased the value of the Minnesota Twins to $405 million, a
bump of 25 percent.42 Again, like the Timberwolves ownership in the 1990s,
the Twins ownership received a substantial amount of equity from their new
stadium. In exchange, Minnesota taxpayers will pay an estimated $1.085
billion plus interest for new and renovated sports stadiums, including the new
33. Id. at 167.
34. Id. at 169-70.
35. Id.
36. Maya Rao, Target Center Deal Bound to a Mistake, STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/138536309.html.
37. DEMAUSE& CAGAN, supra note 16, at 171.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Mark Yost, If They Build It, You Will Pay, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB]0001424052702304017404575165760977036190.html.
41. Rochelle Olson, Hennepin County Taxpayers on Track to Pay Ballpark Off Early, STAR
TRIBUNE (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.startribune.comiocal/minneapolis/185120531 .html.
42. Doug Grow, Target Field/Sales Tax Combo Providing a Financial Home Run for
Hennepin County and Minneapolis, MINNPOST (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-
policy/2010/10/target-fieldsales-tax-combo-providing-financial-home-run-hennepin-county-and.
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Vikings stadium, discussed infra.
III. THE NEW VIKINGS STADIUM
Minnesota residents were strongly divided regarding a public subsidy
package for the funding of a new Vikings stadium. According to three polls
taken by the Minneapolis Star Tribune, a majority of Minnesota residents
were consistently opposed "to using public subsidies for the new stadium."4 3
The opposition is somewhat surprising considering the Vikings have spent
more than $3 million in a statewide lobbying effort since 2005." The
opposition partly reflected the fact that, at the time, Minnesota faced a
projected $1.1 billion budget shortfall for the 2014-2015 biennium; thus,
many stadium opponents questioned why public funds should be used to
subsidize the Vikings ownership.45 State Senator John Marty (DFL-
Roseville), a vocal opponent of a public subsidy package for the new stadium,
argued that "a taxpayer subsidy [for] a 64,000-seat stadium would amount to
$45 per seat per game, including preseason games, for the next 30 years."46
Proponents argue that a new Vikings stadium will result in significant
economic development.47 Those pitching the stadium claim that "local
establishments will see a rise in game day sales of $145 million; jobs will be
created, including 1,600 in construction worth $300 million ... ; tax revenues
will increase $26 million; [and] property values will rise . . "48
Unfortunately, these types of economic benefits represent the standard
argument purported by the owners of professional franchises, but the
evidence does not support their claims. The benefits of publicly funded
stadiums are largely divided amongst team owners and players with
taxpayers bearing most of the risk.49
After much debate, the state and its local partner, the City of
43. Mike Ozanian, Minnesota Vikings Stadium Advocates Using Bogus Poll, FORBES (Mar.
31, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/03/3 I/minnesota-advocates-push-
stadium-deal-using-bogus-poll/. In the fall of 2010, the poll found that 21 percent were in favor and
75 percent opposed. Id. By spring 2012, the gap narrowed, but 56 percent remained opposed. Id.
While Minnesota residents were consistently opposed to public financing of a new Vikings stadium,
65 percent of respondents answered that it was either "very important" or "somewhat important"
for the Vikings to remain in Minnesota. Id. These poll results show the struggle between Minnesota
residents not wanting to provide corporate welfare and, at the same time, not wanting to lose their
teams.
44. Id.
45. Ozanian, supra note 43.
46. Tara Bannow, Experts Debate How to Fund New Vikings Stadium, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar.
31, 2011, available at http://www.startribune.com/sports/vikings/1I 8958469.html.
47. Illya Shapiro, Politicians and Team Owners Snooker Sports Fans and Taxpayers,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ilya-shapiro/sports-stadiums-
taxes b 1537177.html.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Minneapolis, approved a subsidy package for a new Vikings stadium to be
built near the site of the Metrodome in downtown Minneapolis."o The cost of
the new stadium is estimated to be $975 million with a projected opening
date of fall 2016. The Minnesota House of Representatives approved the
appropriation in a close, but bipartisan, vote of 71-60.5' The Minnesota
Senate approved the appropriation with an even closer margin of 36-30.52 On
May 14, 2012, Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton (DFL) signed the Vikings
stadium bill into law." The state's passage of the Vikings stadium bill
attempted to ensure that the bill would conquer its final political obstacle in
the Minneapolis City Council, because the bill included language that
nullified a provision in the Minneapolis City Charter requiring voter approval
for any stadium subsidy of $10 million or more.54 Surprisingly, despite the
state's passage of a bill that nullified the applicable charter provision, the
Minneapolis City Council remained bitterly divided over the proposed
stadium, its location, and the city's portion of the stadium's estimated cost."
Council members opposed to the stadium bill argued that the measure should
be voted on by Minneapolis residents.56 Ultimately, the stadium squeaked by
the Minneapolis City Council on a razor-thin 7-6 vote and in the process
"made a decades-long commitment to subsidizing professional sports. . . .""
The costs associated with the new Vikings stadium is divided between
initial construction costs and facility operating costs during the agreed-upon
30-year lease. Of the nearly $1 billion stadium construction cost, the state
agreed to pay $348 million and the city agreed to pay an additional $150
50. See Appendix A for a visual comparison of the Metrodome and the new Vikings stadium.
51. Of the 71 yea votes, 38 were democrats and 33 were republicans. Of the nay votes, 21
were democrats and 39 were republicans. House, Senate Votes on Vikings Stadium, STAR TRIBUNE
(May 10, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/151027285.html.
52. Of the 36 yea votes, 21 were democrats and 15 were republicans. Of the nay votes, 8 were
democrats and 22 were republicans. Id.
53. Mike Kaszuba, Dayton Cheered-and Heckled-as He Signs Vikings Stadium Bill, STAR
TRIBUNE (May 14, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/151405495.html.
54. Eric Roper, Final Stadium Bill Nullifies Key Section of City Charter, STAR TRIBUNE (May
10, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/local/blogs/150950835.html, [hereinafter Roper, Nullifies
City Charter].
55. Eric Roper, Vikings Stadium Clears Final Hurdle, STAR TRIBUNE, May 25, 2012, at Al
[hereinafter Roper, Clears Final Hurdle].
56. Id. at A9.
57. Id. at Al. As part of the City of Minneapolis' participation in paying for the new Vikings
stadium, the Target Center-home to the Minnesota Timberwolves-was also allocated
(approximately) $100 million for renovations. Id. The final renovation cost and the amount of public
funding continue to fluctuate. Initially, the City of Minneapolis agreed to pay two-thirds of the
Target Center's renovation costs, but unilaterally lowered that proportion to one-half. Kyle Potter,
Target Center Renovation Delayed Over Cost Disputes, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Nov. 28,
2012), http://www.bizjoumals.com/twincities/news/2012/11/28/target-center-renovations-
delayed.html. In November 2012, the city announced that it expected the Timberwolves to match
the city's investment dollar for dollar. Id. The Target Center renovation was expected to begin in
May 2013, but the project is delayed until the parties can negotiate the final renovation cost. Id.
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million." With respect to facility operating costs, the City of Minneapolis
agreed to pay nearly $200 million for expenses and improvements during the
term of the lease.59 These operating costs "will be on a sliding scale, starting
at $6.5 million in 2021 and climbing to $13 million by 2046.",60 The Vikings
agreed to pay $477 million for construction "plus another $390 million for
operating expenses and capital improvements over the 30-year lease.""
When completed, the new Vikings stadium will be the fourth most expensive
stadium in National Football League ("NFL") history.62
The new Vikings stadium will be funded through the issuance of stadium
bonds and an extension of existing revenue streams. The state is issuing
stadium bonds to cover its portion of the construction costs.63 Annual debt
service on the bonds is estimated to be $34 million. 64 The state planned to
cover its annual debt service through new revenue generated by electronic
forms of "charitable gambling," known as "e-gaming. "65 Minnesota
estimated that e-gaming would generate $35 million in tax revenue
annually.66 Unfortunately, that estimate has been reduced to only $1.7 million
in 2013 due to the limited number of electronic devices that have been
installed.6' The state estimated that a total of 2,500 devices would be
installed, but only 234 are operational as of May 14, 2013.68 In order to offset
this shortfall, the Minnesota Legislature passed a bill that redirects a one-time
cigarette excise tax "on current tobacco inventory" and closes a corporate
income tax loop-hole.69 When accounting for interest over the life of the
agreement, the city will spend an estimated $678 million, or an average of
58. Mark Peters & Jack Nicas, Minnesota Vikings Set to Get New Stadium, WALL ST. J., May
II, 2012, at B6.
59. Doug Grow, Vikings Stadium Funding Plans-Their Strengths and Weaknesses,
MINNPOST (May 2, 2012),,http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2012/05/vikings-stadium-
funding-plans-%E2%80%94-their-strengths -and-weaknesses.
60. Id.
61. Peters & Nicas, supra note 58, at B6.
62. Id.
63. Bill Salisbury & Doug Belden, As New Vikings Stadium Takes Shape, State Funding Still
Squishy, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (May 14, 2013), http://www.twincities.com/ci_23243275/
vikings-stadiums-design-unveiled-how-fill-funding-gap.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 349 (2013) (legalizing specified forms of gambling that result in
expenditures ("charitable contributions") to various entities and organizations, such as nonprofits,
the United States, the state of Minnesota, and any political subdivision of Minnesota) [hereinafter
"Charitable Gambling Statute"].
66. Salisbury & Beldon, supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Tim Nelson, Dayton Administration Unveils 'Secret' Stadium Finance Plan, MPR NEWS
(May 16, 2013), http:/iblogs.mpmews.org/stadium-watch/2013/05/16/dayton-administration-
unveils-secret-stadium-finance-plan/.
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$22.6 million annually."o Minneapolis is funding its portion of the stadium
through the extension of a three percent sales tax collected by the state on
Minneapolis' restaurants, liquor sales, and hotels until 2046." The state and
city will need to continue generating this level of additional revenue in order
to cover the costs of the stadium for the next several decades.72
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Recent History: Defining the Problem
For a multitude of reasons, it does not make economic sense for taxpayers
to absorb a significant portion of the cost for a new Vikings stadium (or any
other stadium). First, public funding of stadiums results in large equity gains
for owners and salaries for players. One study found that new stadiums
provide increases of: (1) team profits by $11 million annually; (2) players
payroll by $14 million annually; and (3) team value by an average of $90
million.73 A study performed by the Cato Institute found that 55 percent of
the gains from subsidies to professional sports teams go to players and 45
percent to owners.74 The owners of the Vikings bought the team for $600
million in 2005." By 2012, Forbes appraised the team at $796 million, which
is expected to rise significantly once the new stadium is constructed.
Second, new stadiums have negligible economic benefits. Again, the
Vikings argued that local establishments will see a rise in game day sales,
jobs will be created, tax revenues will increase, and property values will
rise.77 The evidence does not support these claims.7 ' A study of 37
metropolitan areas found that the "overall [economic] impact [of professional
70. See Roper, Clears Final Hurdle, supra note 55, at A9.
71. See id.
72. It is important to note the obvious: these funding streams only address the revenue
necessary to pay off the new Vikings stadium. It does not include Hennepin County's annual debt
service of nearly $26 million for Target Field. Duchschere, supra note 29, at B2. It includes neither
the $55 million owed by the City of Minneapolis for the Target Center nor the additional $50 million
in public funds necessary to renovate the Target Center. Id. It also does not include the $56.8 million
still owed by the City of St. Paul for the Xcel Energy Center. Id.
73. Craig A. Depken, Anderson Sports Performance Lecture at the Univ. of Tex. at Arlington,
The Economics of Sports Arenas: A Property Rights Approach (Apr. 16, 2003).
74. Shapiro, supra note 47.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See BAADE, supra note 7, at 12 (economist Robert Baade studied 48 cities over a 30-year
period and concluded that, of the 32 cities where there was a change in the number of sports teams,
30 showed "no significant relationship between the presence of the teams real, trend adjusted, per-
capita personal income growth."); Id. at 15 (of the 30 cities where there was a change in the number
of stadiums ten years old or less, 27 cities showed "no significant relationship between the presence
of a stadium and real, trend-adjusted, per-capita personal income growth. In all three of the
remaining cases, the presence of a sports stadium was significantly negative.").
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sports teams] is negative."" One of the alleged economic benefits of stadium
construction is the creation of jobs." With respect to construction, the new
Vikings stadium is expected to create 700 full-time jobs for a period of three
years." With respect to operation, stadiums require relatively few employees
and the jobs that are created are generally low-wage, temporary positions.8 2
Creation of temporary and low-wage jobs is not what the public should be
subsidizing.
Third, the cost of a state-of-the-art stadium far outweighs its benefits. In
fact, independent findings on the economic impact of stadiums have
"uniformly found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation
between sports facility construction and economic development."" The
Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank found that between 1994 and 2001 "a
typical baseball or football stadium costs taxpayers $188 million while
generating only $40 million in long-term benefits .. . ." With respect to tax
revenues, cities often ignore the fact that stadiums generate almost zero new
revenue." Stadiums generate new revenue in three ways: (1) people from
outside the area spend funds in and around the stadium; (2) the stadium
results in area residents choosing to spend more on entertainment locally; or
(3) "the funds keep turning over locally, thereby 'creating' new spending.""
Sports fans are limited by the same budgetary constraints as any other
household. If fans decide to attend a sporting event, then that household has
less money to spend on other forms of entertainment. Studies also indicate
that stadiums do not increase tourism (enticing people from outside the area
to come spend money in the area) or spur entrepreneurship (helping funds
turn over locally to create new spending)." Hence, stadiums generate
79. Coates & Humphreys, supra note 4, at 19.
80. John Marty, Why Public Funding for a Vikings Stadium Doesn't Make Sense, MPR NEWS
(May 1, 2012), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/05/01/john-marty.
81. Id.
82. Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, The Effect of Professional Sports on the Earnings
of Individuals: Evidence from Microeconomic Data 7-8 (Univ. of Md. at Bait. Cnty., Working
Paper No. 03-104, 2003) [hereinafter The Effect of Professional Sports].
83. John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their
Communities, 14 J. OF ECON. PERSP., 95, 103 (2000). But cf The Effect of Professional Sports,
supra note 82, at 8 (finding only retail employees earn higher wages per year as a result of the
presence of professional sports facilities).
84. Jordan Rappaport & Chad Wilkerson, What are the Benefits of Hosting a Major League
Sports Franchise?, 86 ECON. REv., 55, 68-69 (2001).
85. Zaretsky, supra note 11, at 7.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. John F. Zipp, Spring Training, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 427, 429-30, 446-48 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, eds.,
Brookings Inst. Press, 1997). (presenting a detailed analysis of the economic impact of baseball
spring training programs in Florida); Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 83, at 107-09.
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minimal, if any, new revenue.8 9
Fourth, new stadiums do not improve team attendance long-term. Studies
show thatonly new baseball stadiums result in increased attendance initially,
and even then, the "novelty" dissipates within a few seasons.90 Once the
novelty of a new stadium wears off, team attendance and profits decrease,
which results in the eventual demand of a new or upgraded facility.9' After
all, "[i]t is a buyers' [sic] market for professional sports franchises looking
for [new] facilities." 92 The number of teams in any given league is
intentionally kept below the number of cities able to support a team.93 The
monopolistic characteristics of professional sports leagues and the power of
team owners, under league rules, to city hop gives "teams great bargaining
leverage" in demanding new stadiums when revenues decline.94 This
produces a vicious cycle that needs to be broken in Minnesota.
B. Looking to the Future: Determining the Options
There are several options for alleviating the public's burden of financing
new stadium construction. First, professional sports leagues allow teams to
relocate in an effort to "attain better stadium deals."9' An almost unrestrained
ability to city hop gives franchise owners great bargaining leverage. 96 if
league rules were amended so that moving a franchise was more difficult,
then cities would have more leverage at the bargaining table." This would
89. See Marlys Harris, Minneapolis' Downtown East Redevelopment: Where's Wells Fargo,
MINNPOST (May 15, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/cityscape/2013/05/minneapolis-downtown-
east-redevelopment-wheres-wells-fargo (it should be noted that less than 24 hours after the design
of the new stadium was unveiled, a $400 million redevelopment plan for the area surrounding the
stadium was announced. The plan calls for two 20-story office towers, 40,000 square feet of retail
space, 300 units of housing, 1,700 parking spots, and a park linking the new stadium with the city's
business core. Minneapolis Mayor R.T. Rybak stated that the redevelopment will be paid for by
both private funds and general-obligation bonds. While privately funded development could provide
economic benefits for Minneapolis, it remains to be seen who will occupy the new space); see
Appendix B (a visual comparison of Downtown East with the proposed redevelopment); see
Editorial, Vikings Stadium Design Enlivens Downtown East, STAR TRIBUNE (May 14, 2013),
http://www.startribune.com/opinion/editorials/207457001.html?page=1&c-y (Wells Fargo has
indicated an interest in the proposed development, but such a move would simply shift an existing
business from one building to another and not create new jobs or revenue).
90. BAADE, supra note 7, at 13-14.
91. See Tim Nelson, Xcel Energy Center also Now Eyeing Big Upgrades, Potential
Expansion, MPR NEWS BLOG (May 22, 2013), http://blogs.mpmews.org/stadium-
watch/2013/05/22/xcel-energy-center-also-now-eyeing-big-upgrades-potential-expansion/ (the
initiative by the Minnesota Wild to "upgrade" the Xcel Energy Center).
92. Scott A. Jensen, Comment, Financing Professional Sports Facilities with Federal Tax
Subsidies: Is It Sound Tax Policy?, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 425, 427 (2000).
93. JOSEPH L. BAST, THE HEARTLAND INST., No. 85 SPORTS STADIUM MADNESS: WHY IT
STARTED, How TO STOP IT 21 (1998).
94. Jensen, supra note 92, at 457-58.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 458.
97. Id.
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allow cities to pressure teams into putting more skin in the game when it
comes time for consideration of a new stadium. Unfortunately, it is highly
improbable that a professional sports league would voluntarily curtail its
ability to maximize revenue. Thus, Congress would need to pass legislation
regulating the movement of sports franchises. While relocation restrictions
have previously been proposed in Congress, they have not been adopted, and
Minnesota should not rely on federal action-especially considering the
partisan climate-to solve the problem.98
Second, current league revenue-sharing rules encourage new stadium
construction whether by relocation or otherwise.99 Successful professional
sports franchises share their revenue with less successful or smaller market
franchises.' 0 This includes revenue generated from merchandise,
broadcasting, and ticket sales.' Teams are allowed, however, to keep all
revenue generated from a team's stadium (non-ticket revenue).'0 2 Non-ticket
revenue includes money generated from concessions, signage, advertising,
club boxes, and luxury suites.0 3 Therefore, maintaining a stadium with the
latest in modern amenities allows teams to maximize revenue under the
current revenue-sharing models. If professional sports leagues amended their
current revenue-sharing models, then teams would have less incentive to
continuously seek new facilities. Akin to a Congressional antitrust
exemption, it is unlikely that leagues will amend their current revenue-
sharing models, because such models have resulted in teams deriving great
benefit from new facilities.
Third, state and local government could take action to prevent public
subsidies from supporting new facilities for privately-owned teams.104 One
avenue for accomplishing this prohibition would be for the U.S. Conference
of Mayors ("U.S. Mayors") and the National Governors' Association
("NGA") to agree to not use public subsidies for such a purpose. o This issue
has been raised within both groups, but no action has resulted.'o6 One could
98. Id. at 459; see also Jensen, supra note 92, at 459 (both the Sports Antitrust Reform Act of
1996 S. 1767, 104th Cong. and the Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998 H. R. 3817,
105th Cong. were aimed at developing a list of criteria that must be satisfied before franchises could
relocate. The proposals would have created an antitrust exemption for professional sports
franchises); Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 83, at 112 (another federal approach was proposed
by U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D - N.Y.), who advocated for a bill prohibiting the use
of the federal tax exemption on municipal bonds for facilities played in by privately-owned teams.
The bill was never passed).
99. BAST, supra note 93, at 22.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 83, at 111.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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surmise that no action has resulted due to the limited number of cities
impacted by franchise relocation and "[t]hose mayors or governors not facing
a threat are not inclined to alienate the professional leagues with whom they
have or want a relationship."' 0 Competition amongst cities and states for
potential economic development creates too large a temptation; therefore, it
is highly improbable that the U.S. Mayors and NGA will reach consensus
and take united action on this issue.
V. RECOMMENDATION
A. Cementing the Relationship Between the Vikings and Minnesota
At this juncture, readers may question what, if any, options remain for
Minnesota's taxpayers, whom polling consistently found neither wanted to
subsidize a new stadium for the Vikings nor lose the team to another city.'
If a deal providing public subsidies for a new stadium was not reached,
Vikings ownership was considering relocating the team to Los Angeles,
amongst other cities."0 ' Thus, the question remains: how can we balance the
public's distaste for subsidizing private owners with the assurance that the
Vikings will remain in Minnesota?
The balance is best struck by challenging NFL rules to allow partial
public ownership of the Vikings. While this notion probably appears
farfetched, the idea is not new to Minnesota."o On November 7, 2011, State
Representative Phyllis Kahn (DFL - Minneapolis), who is serving her 21st
term in the Minnesota Legislature, proposed a stock sale of 70 percent of the
Vikings with proceeds going toward the funding of a new stadium."'
Unsurprisingly, the Vikings ownership and the NFL, in particular, resisted
the proposal." 2 Such bold action is necessary, however, to balance the
bargaining position between Minnesota taxpayers and their teams. Minnesota
has consistently provided a lifeline to its professional sports franchises, so it
is only fair that the state receive a more robust return on investment-a return
that helps cement its teams in Minnesota.
107. Id.
108. Ozanian, supra note 43.
109. Ken Belson, N.F.L. Warns That Vikings Could Move, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/sports/football/nfl-warns-that-vikings-could-
move.html?_r-0.
110. See Steve Rushin, Curtains?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 22, 1997, at 6 (noting that in
1997, Minnesota Twins owner Carl Pohlad offered to donate the team to a local non-profit
foundation).
11l. Mike Florio, Partial Ownership of Vikings Doesn't Mesh With League Rules,
NBCSPORTS.COM (Nov. 7, 2011), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/07/partial-public-
ownership-of-vikings-doesnt-mesh-with-league-rules/.
112. Id.
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B. League Rules and Antitrust Argument
Each major sports league has adopted rules governing the transfer of
team ownership."' While the major sports leagues have historically resisted
teams going public, their position has softened over the past two decades." 4
The NFL has regrettably not followed in the footsteps of Major League
Baseball ("MLB"), the NHL, and the National Basketball Association
("NBA")."' Since 1980, the NFL's ownership rules have changed several
times.' At present, Article 3.5 of the NFL Constitution prohibits corporate
ownership of franchises, and three-quarters of NFL owners must approve all
transfers of ownership."' The NFL also maintains an "uncodified team policy
that prohibits public offerings of shares in NFL clubs" and requires that each
team maintain a principal owner who, in aggregate with family members,
controls 30 percent of the franchise."' To overcome the NFL's codified and
uncodified restrictions on public ownership, Minnesota should bring a legal
challenge against the NFL's restrictions as constituting a prima facie
113. Ryan Schaffer, A Piece of the Rock (or the Rockets): The Viability of Wide-spread Public
Offerings of Professional Sports Franchises, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 201, 208 (2006).
114. Id. at 223; see also Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, Considerations for
Professional Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 88-92 (2010)
(noting that: (1) MLB changed their policy in 1997 to allow teams to distribute 49 percent by public
offering; (2) the NHL permits public ownership upon review by the league and so long as one
shareholder maintains ultimate control; and (3) the NBA permits a team to sell shares to the public.
In 1986, the NBA's Boston Celtics went public. In 1996, the NHL's Florida Panthers sold public
shares. In 1998, the MLB's Cleveland Indians publically sold four million shares for $60 million.
The Green Bay Packers remain the NFL's only publicly owned franchise.).
115. Id.
116. Vince Riccio, Should Struggling NFL Teams Be Allowed Public Ownership?,
BLEACHERREPORT.COM (Aug. 9, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/432359-should-
struggling-nfl-teams-be-allowed-public-ownership ("In 1980, the NFL adopted amendments that
disallowed teams from having more than 32 owners with a principal owner maintaining at least 30
percent ownership. As team values increased, the NFL further amended its ownership rules to allow
owners who had maintained ownership for ten years to control only 20 percent if a family member
remains in control of an additional ten percent. In 2009, the NFL amended ownership rules to allow
a principal owner to maintain ten percent ownership so long as other family members controlled 20
percent.").
117. Schaffer, supra note 113, at 209; see also Dave Zirin, Those Non-Profit Packers, THE
NEW YORKER, (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/sportingscene/2011/01/
those-non-profit-packers.html (explaining the success of the Green Bay Packers as a non-profit
organization and how Rules 3.2(A) and 3.5 of the NFL Constitution disallows other teams from
operating as charitable organizations).
118. Robert Bacon, Initial Public Offerings and Professional Sports Teams: The Regulations
Work, But Are Owners and Investors Listening?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 139, 150 (2000); see
generally Kristi Dosh, Examining NFL's Tax-Exempt Status, ESPN.COM (Jun. 4, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/j/id/9342479/examining-nfl-tax-exempt-status-challenged-us-
senator-tom-coburn (the hypocrisy of this position is worth noting. The NFL, which generates an
estimated $9 billion annually, is tax exempt under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code
for operating a trade or industry association. U.S. Senator Tom Coburn (R - Okla.) has proposed an
amendment to the Marketplace Fairness Act that would remove the NFL as a tax-exempt
organization.).
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violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act." 9
The primary authority for the contention that the NFL's prohibition of
public ownership violates antitrust law is Sullivan v. National Football
League.'20 In 1991, the owner of the New England Patriots, William H.
Sullivan ("Sullivan"), who wanted to sell 49 percent of the team to the public,
sued the NFL.12 ' Sullivan argued "that the NFL's policy against public
ownership generally restricts competition between clubs for the sale of their
ownership interests . . . .""2 A jury in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts ruled in favor of Sullivan and found that the NFL's
prohibition on public ownership violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.123 The
NFL appealed the ruling and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that NFL teams do not constitute a single enterprise and that actual
competition among the teams need not be demonstrated, so long as the
potential for competition exists. 24 'The court also noted that the District
Court's ruling regarding the existence of "competition between teams for the
sale of ownership interests was based on sufficient evidence" and rejected
the NFL's claim that Sullivan "failed to prove his injury was caused by [an]
alleged antitrust violation." 25
The First Circuit remanded the case, however, due to prejudicial error,
and the parties settled out of court.126 It remains the only circuit to have
addressed "the issue of whether the NFL policy prohibiting public ownership
interests violates . . . the Sherman [Antitrust] Act." 27 Thus, Sullivan is the
basis for challenging the NFL's prohibition of public ownership.128
Accordingly, Minnesota, utilizing Sullivan, should pressure the NFL to
accept partial public ownership of the Vikings or risk invalidation of its
ownership rules and abandonment of its uncodified ownership policies.
The likelihood of success is increased by the standing of the NFL's only
publicly owned franchise-the Green Bay Packers ("Packers"). In 1919,
119. Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Community-Based Ownership of a National Football League
Franchise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of NFL Teams, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 589, 592 (1998).
120. Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 1096; see also Genevieve F. E. Birren, NFL vs. Sherman Act: How the NFL's Ban
on Public Ownership Violates Federal Antitrust Laws 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 121 (2004), reprinted in
THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 26, 26-30 (Scott Rosner & Kenneth Shropshire ed., 2011).
122. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1098.
123. Id. at 1096.
124. Id. at 1098, 1100; see also Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201
(2010) (finding that NFL teams do not operate as a single enterprise and thus, are subject to antitrust
law).
125. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099, 1106.
126. Id. at 1091; see generally Frank Litsky, Billy Sullivan, 86, Founder of Football Patriots,
Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at B9. (in 1996, Sullivan and the NFL reached an out-of-court
settlement whereby the NFL agreed to pay Sullivan $11.5 million).
127. Hartel, supra note 119, at 606.
128. Id.
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Curly Lambeau formed the Packers and four years later reorganized the team
as a Wisconsin non-profit corporation (the "Packers' Model").'" Between
1950 and 1997, the Packers had nearly 2,000 shareholders who owned more
than 4,600 shares.'30 Today, more than 100,000 shareholders-over 90
percent of whom live in the Green Bay area-own more than 4 million shares
of the team.' 3 ' The Packers' restated articles of incorporation provide that
shareholders may not own more than 200 shares, and the stock pays no
dividends.'32 In addition to public ownership, the Packers' bylaws require any
relocation to be approved by a majority of its shareholders.'33 As a result of
its ownership structure, the Green Bay area has yet to experience a
shakedown for a new stadium or a threat of relocation.13 4 Public ownership
of the Packers has provided and will continue to provide great stability for
both the Packers and the Green Bay community. 35
C. Utilizing a Rival's Model in Minnesota
Unbeknownst to many, a bill was introduced in the Minnesota House of
Representatives proposing the Packers' Model as a solution to the Vikings
stadium quandary. 3 6 State Representative Andrew Falk introduced the bill
calling for the establishment of a non-profit corporation responsible for
operating and purchasing the Vikings at a "price to be agreed upon" (the
"Falk Plan").' Under the Falk Plan and similar to the Packers' Model, a
Vikings nonprofit corporation (the "Corporation") would utilize its articles
of incorporation to set limits on the number of shares controlled by any one
shareholder and issue stock that does not pay dividends. The Corporation
would also adopt bylaws requiring any relocation of the Vikings to be
approved by a majority of the team's shareholders.' The author proposes
one modification to the Falk Plan. Pursuant to NFL rules, the Wilf family,
who currently owns the Vikings, should be allowed to maintain a 30 percent
stake in the team and remain the principal owner. A willingness to maintain
a principal owner may provide a large enough carrot for the NFL to balk and
accept partial public ownership of the Vikings in order to avoid prolonged
129. Id. at 593.
130. Id. at 594.
131. Zirin, supra note 117.
132. Hartel, supra note 119, at 594.
133. David Nielsen, Packer Envy: Green Bay Fans Don't Have to Worry About Their Team
Moving-They Own It, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1995, at Bl, available at 1995 WLNR 312515.
134. Hartel, supra note 119, at 594.
135. Id.
136. H.F. 3010, 87th Leg., 2d Sess. (Minn. 2012).
137. Id.
138. This plan assumes that, as with the Packers' Model, a majority of the Corporation's
shareholders are fans of the Vikings who want the Vikings to remain in the Twin Cities and be
successful.
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litigation.
While the workability of such a proposal is debatable, the Falk Plan
would help ensure the long-term viability of the Vikings franchise and
provide a competitive advantage to current Vikings' owners. As indicated
supra, NFL rules restrict the liquidity of team owners.' Owners are
restricted by both a limited number of buyers in the marketplace and league
ownership rules. Pursuant to current NFL rules, the Vikings' ownership
would likely have to sell either majority control of the team or the team in its
entirety.'40 The Falk Plan would allow Vikings' ownership to liquidate a
percentage of their investment in order to raise the necessary capital to
renovate existing facilities or build new facilities.' 4 ' The additional capital
generated by a partial liquidation could also provide the Vikings with a
competitive advantage in attracting top players.142 Another advantage of the
plan, assuming the author-proposed modification supra, is that the Vikings'
ownership could remain the principal owners of the team. Finally, selling
shares of the Vikings' franchise to Vikings' fans should induce fan loyalty
and engagement, which may lead to increased attendance, memorabilia sales,
and concession revenue. 143 The advantages provided to the Vikings' owners
by the Falk Plan should entice their support, or, at the very least, merit serious
consideration.
With respect to Minnesota residents, the Falk Plan would protect primary
citizen objectives. The benefits of the plan for residents would be, at a
minimum, threefold: (1) a substantial assurance that the Vikings will remain
Minnesota's NFL team; (2) a savings of millions of taxpayer dollars in debt
service on stadium bonds; and (3) the elimination of a three percent surcharge
on hotels, food, and liquor in Minneapolis. These protections are critical for
cementing the long-term bond between the Vikings, its fan base, and
Minnesota taxpayers.
CONCLUSION
Minnesota must reevaluate the way it approaches professional stadium
construction. The Falk Plan provides an opportunity to save Minnesota
taxpayers millions of dollars and ensure that the Vikings remain in
Minnesota. Such an innovative solution provides the best avenue for escaping
the current extortion model; thus, the Minnesota Legislature should
139. See discussion supra Part V.B (describing the restrictive ownership policies of the NFL).
140. Garrett & Green, supra note 114, at 77.
141. Id. at 73. For example, an initial public offering ("IPO") of 4 million shares at $125 per
share could raise more than $498 million, which constitutes the amount necessary to fund what is
currently the state and city's portion of the new Vikings stadium. The author proposes four million
shares for the IPO based on the number of shares that the Packers have outstanding in a significantly
smaller market.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 80.
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reconsider the advantages and stability provided by partial public ownership.
W. Edwards Deming once quipped "learning is not compulsory ... neither is
survival." Minnesota must learn from its recent history of publicly
subsidizing professional sports stadiums and break away from the
monumental, debt laden stadium arms race. If it does not, future generations
of Minnesotans will be saddled with decades of debt, unnecessary taxes that
provide nothing except meager short-term gains, and team owners licking
their chops for the next sweetheart deal.
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